hscontrol: validate machine key and bind src/dst in SSH check handler
SSHActionHandler now verifies that the Noise session's machine key matches the dst node before proceeding. The (src, dst) pair is captured at hold-and-delegate time via a new SSHCheckBinding on AuthRequest so sshActionFollowUp can verify the follow-up URL matches. The OIDC non-registration callback requires the authenticated user to own the src node before approving.
This commit is contained in:
parent
0d4f2293ff
commit
99767cf805
6 changed files with 404 additions and 17 deletions
|
|
@ -36,6 +36,28 @@ var ErrUnsupportedURLParameterType = errors.New("unsupported URL parameter type"
|
|||
// ErrNoAuthSession is returned when an auth_id does not match any active auth session.
|
||||
var ErrNoAuthSession = errors.New("no auth session found")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrSSHDstNodeNotFound is returned when the dst node id on a Noise SSH
|
||||
// action request does not match any registered node.
|
||||
var ErrSSHDstNodeNotFound = errors.New("ssh action: unknown dst node id")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrSSHMachineKeyMismatch is returned when the Noise session's machine
|
||||
// key does not match the dst node referenced in the SSH action URL.
|
||||
var ErrSSHMachineKeyMismatch = errors.New(
|
||||
"ssh action: noise session machine key does not match dst node",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrSSHAuthSessionNotBound is returned when an SSH action follow-up
|
||||
// references an auth session that is not bound to an SSH check pair.
|
||||
var ErrSSHAuthSessionNotBound = errors.New(
|
||||
"ssh action: cached auth session is not an SSH-check binding",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrSSHBindingMismatch is returned when an SSH action follow-up's
|
||||
// (src, dst) pair does not match the cached binding for its auth_id.
|
||||
var ErrSSHBindingMismatch = errors.New(
|
||||
"ssh action: cached binding does not match request src/dst",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// ts2021UpgradePath is the path that the server listens on for the WebSockets upgrade.
|
||||
ts2021UpgradePath = "/ts2021"
|
||||
|
|
@ -337,6 +359,37 @@ func (ns *noiseServer) SSHActionHandler(
|
|||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Authenticate the Noise session: the destination node is the
|
||||
// tailscaled instance asking us whether to permit an incoming SSH
|
||||
// connection, so its Noise session must belong to dst. Without this
|
||||
// check any unauthenticated client could open a Noise tunnel with a
|
||||
// throwaway machine key and pollute lastSSHAuth for arbitrary
|
||||
// (src, dst) pairs, defeating SSH check-mode's stolen-key
|
||||
// protections.
|
||||
dstNode, ok := ns.headscale.state.GetNodeByID(dstNodeID)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
httpError(writer, NewHTTPError(
|
||||
http.StatusNotFound,
|
||||
"dst node not found",
|
||||
fmt.Errorf("%w: %d", ErrSSHDstNodeNotFound, dstNodeID),
|
||||
))
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if dstNode.MachineKey() != ns.machineKey {
|
||||
httpError(writer, NewHTTPError(
|
||||
http.StatusUnauthorized,
|
||||
"machine key does not match dst node",
|
||||
fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"%w: machine key %s, dst node %d",
|
||||
ErrSSHMachineKeyMismatch, ns.machineKey.ShortString(), dstNodeID,
|
||||
),
|
||||
))
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reqLog := log.With().
|
||||
Uint64("src_node_id", srcNodeID.Uint64()).
|
||||
Uint64("dst_node_id", dstNodeID.Uint64()).
|
||||
|
|
@ -426,14 +479,16 @@ func (ns *noiseServer) sshAction(
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// No auto-approval — create an auth session and hold.
|
||||
return ns.sshActionHoldAndDelegate(reqLog, &action)
|
||||
return ns.sshActionHoldAndDelegate(reqLog, &action, srcNodeID, dstNodeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sshActionHoldAndDelegate creates a new auth session and returns a
|
||||
// HoldAndDelegate action that directs the client to authenticate.
|
||||
// sshActionHoldAndDelegate creates a new auth session bound to the
|
||||
// (src, dst) pair and returns a HoldAndDelegate action that directs the
|
||||
// client to authenticate.
|
||||
func (ns *noiseServer) sshActionHoldAndDelegate(
|
||||
reqLog zerolog.Logger,
|
||||
action *tailcfg.SSHAction,
|
||||
srcNodeID, dstNodeID types.NodeID,
|
||||
) (*tailcfg.SSHAction, error) {
|
||||
holdURL, err := url.Parse(
|
||||
ns.headscale.cfg.ServerURL +
|
||||
|
|
@ -457,7 +512,10 @@ func (ns *noiseServer) sshActionHoldAndDelegate(
|
|||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ns.headscale.state.SetAuthCacheEntry(authID, types.NewAuthRequest())
|
||||
ns.headscale.state.SetAuthCacheEntry(
|
||||
authID,
|
||||
types.NewSSHCheckAuthRequest(srcNodeID, dstNodeID),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
authURL := ns.headscale.authProvider.AuthURL(authID)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -512,6 +570,32 @@ func (ns *noiseServer) sshActionFollowUp(
|
|||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify the cached binding matches the (src, dst) pair the
|
||||
// follow-up URL claims. Without this check an attacker who knew an
|
||||
// auth_id could submit a follow-up for any other (src, dst) pair
|
||||
// and have its verdict recorded against that pair instead.
|
||||
if !auth.IsSSHCheck() {
|
||||
return nil, NewHTTPError(
|
||||
http.StatusBadRequest,
|
||||
"auth session is not for SSH check",
|
||||
fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrSSHAuthSessionNotBound, authID),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
binding := auth.SSHCheckBinding()
|
||||
if binding.SrcNodeID != srcNodeID || binding.DstNodeID != dstNodeID {
|
||||
return nil, NewHTTPError(
|
||||
http.StatusUnauthorized,
|
||||
"src/dst pair does not match auth session",
|
||||
fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"%w: cached %d->%d, request %d->%d",
|
||||
ErrSSHBindingMismatch,
|
||||
binding.SrcNodeID, binding.DstNodeID,
|
||||
srcNodeID, dstNodeID,
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reqLog.Trace().Caller().Msg("SSH action follow-up")
|
||||
|
||||
verdict := <-auth.WaitForAuth()
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue