hscontrol: validate machine key and bind src/dst in SSH check handler

SSHActionHandler now verifies that the Noise session's machine key
matches the dst node before proceeding. The (src, dst) pair is
captured at hold-and-delegate time via a new SSHCheckBinding on
AuthRequest so sshActionFollowUp can verify the follow-up URL
matches. The OIDC non-registration callback requires the
authenticated user to own the src node before approving.
This commit is contained in:
Kristoffer Dalby 2026-04-09 17:41:01 +00:00
parent 0d4f2293ff
commit 99767cf805
6 changed files with 404 additions and 17 deletions

View file

@ -36,6 +36,28 @@ var ErrUnsupportedURLParameterType = errors.New("unsupported URL parameter type"
// ErrNoAuthSession is returned when an auth_id does not match any active auth session.
var ErrNoAuthSession = errors.New("no auth session found")
// ErrSSHDstNodeNotFound is returned when the dst node id on a Noise SSH
// action request does not match any registered node.
var ErrSSHDstNodeNotFound = errors.New("ssh action: unknown dst node id")
// ErrSSHMachineKeyMismatch is returned when the Noise session's machine
// key does not match the dst node referenced in the SSH action URL.
var ErrSSHMachineKeyMismatch = errors.New(
"ssh action: noise session machine key does not match dst node",
)
// ErrSSHAuthSessionNotBound is returned when an SSH action follow-up
// references an auth session that is not bound to an SSH check pair.
var ErrSSHAuthSessionNotBound = errors.New(
"ssh action: cached auth session is not an SSH-check binding",
)
// ErrSSHBindingMismatch is returned when an SSH action follow-up's
// (src, dst) pair does not match the cached binding for its auth_id.
var ErrSSHBindingMismatch = errors.New(
"ssh action: cached binding does not match request src/dst",
)
const (
// ts2021UpgradePath is the path that the server listens on for the WebSockets upgrade.
ts2021UpgradePath = "/ts2021"
@ -337,6 +359,37 @@ func (ns *noiseServer) SSHActionHandler(
return
}
// Authenticate the Noise session: the destination node is the
// tailscaled instance asking us whether to permit an incoming SSH
// connection, so its Noise session must belong to dst. Without this
// check any unauthenticated client could open a Noise tunnel with a
// throwaway machine key and pollute lastSSHAuth for arbitrary
// (src, dst) pairs, defeating SSH check-mode's stolen-key
// protections.
dstNode, ok := ns.headscale.state.GetNodeByID(dstNodeID)
if !ok {
httpError(writer, NewHTTPError(
http.StatusNotFound,
"dst node not found",
fmt.Errorf("%w: %d", ErrSSHDstNodeNotFound, dstNodeID),
))
return
}
if dstNode.MachineKey() != ns.machineKey {
httpError(writer, NewHTTPError(
http.StatusUnauthorized,
"machine key does not match dst node",
fmt.Errorf(
"%w: machine key %s, dst node %d",
ErrSSHMachineKeyMismatch, ns.machineKey.ShortString(), dstNodeID,
),
))
return
}
reqLog := log.With().
Uint64("src_node_id", srcNodeID.Uint64()).
Uint64("dst_node_id", dstNodeID.Uint64()).
@ -426,14 +479,16 @@ func (ns *noiseServer) sshAction(
}
// No auto-approval — create an auth session and hold.
return ns.sshActionHoldAndDelegate(reqLog, &action)
return ns.sshActionHoldAndDelegate(reqLog, &action, srcNodeID, dstNodeID)
}
// sshActionHoldAndDelegate creates a new auth session and returns a
// HoldAndDelegate action that directs the client to authenticate.
// sshActionHoldAndDelegate creates a new auth session bound to the
// (src, dst) pair and returns a HoldAndDelegate action that directs the
// client to authenticate.
func (ns *noiseServer) sshActionHoldAndDelegate(
reqLog zerolog.Logger,
action *tailcfg.SSHAction,
srcNodeID, dstNodeID types.NodeID,
) (*tailcfg.SSHAction, error) {
holdURL, err := url.Parse(
ns.headscale.cfg.ServerURL +
@ -457,7 +512,10 @@ func (ns *noiseServer) sshActionHoldAndDelegate(
)
}
ns.headscale.state.SetAuthCacheEntry(authID, types.NewAuthRequest())
ns.headscale.state.SetAuthCacheEntry(
authID,
types.NewSSHCheckAuthRequest(srcNodeID, dstNodeID),
)
authURL := ns.headscale.authProvider.AuthURL(authID)
@ -512,6 +570,32 @@ func (ns *noiseServer) sshActionFollowUp(
)
}
// Verify the cached binding matches the (src, dst) pair the
// follow-up URL claims. Without this check an attacker who knew an
// auth_id could submit a follow-up for any other (src, dst) pair
// and have its verdict recorded against that pair instead.
if !auth.IsSSHCheck() {
return nil, NewHTTPError(
http.StatusBadRequest,
"auth session is not for SSH check",
fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrSSHAuthSessionNotBound, authID),
)
}
binding := auth.SSHCheckBinding()
if binding.SrcNodeID != srcNodeID || binding.DstNodeID != dstNodeID {
return nil, NewHTTPError(
http.StatusUnauthorized,
"src/dst pair does not match auth session",
fmt.Errorf(
"%w: cached %d->%d, request %d->%d",
ErrSSHBindingMismatch,
binding.SrcNodeID, binding.DstNodeID,
srcNodeID, dstNodeID,
),
)
}
reqLog.Trace().Caller().Msg("SSH action follow-up")
verdict := <-auth.WaitForAuth()