H3/H4/H5: zone-integrity invariants
H3+H4 — Zone SOA invariant. After parsing, loadRRs enforces:
exactly one SOA, owned by the zone apex. Catches three failure modes
with a single guard:
- Missing SOA (H4): a malformed line earlier in the file may have
tripped miekg/dns's ZoneParser into dropping records without
reporting an error via parser.Err(). If the SOA went missing, we
refuse rather than treat the partial parse as authoritative.
- Multiple SOAs (H3): zone files with accidental duplicate SOA
records produce inconsistent zone state visible to AXFR clients.
The old code's first-match SOA-bump would silently propagate the
inconsistency. Now we refuse.
- Non-apex SOA (H3): an SOA whose owner doesn't match the zone
origin is either a parse error or a hand-edit mistake; bumping
it would leave the real apex unchanged. Now we refuse.
assertSingleApexSOA returns a descriptive error so the failure mode
is actionable from logs alone.
H5 — MaxUint32 guard in bumpSerial. The old "+1 defensive advance"
branch would wrap to 0 if soa.Serial == MaxUint32, and downstream
secondaries per RFC 1982 §3.2 treat 0-after-MaxUint32 as "older"
(they refuse to AXFR and the zone goes dark). Now we explicitly check
and refuse with a loud message; operator must reset the serial
manually. Practical reach is zero for our deployment (10000 bumps/day
× 117 years would still fit uint32) but the defensive ceiling matters
for fuzz, hand-edit, or future code-path errors.
The full RFC 1982 wraparound-aware comparison was prototyped but
removed: it broke the legacy-format migration case where a tiny
non-CalVer serial (e.g., 12345) is "more than 2^31 distant" from a
new-format serial (~2.6B), which RFC 1982 reads as "going backwards"
and would block migration. Naive `>` is correct in practice; the
MaxUint32 case is the only real failure mode worth guarding.
New tests:
- TestBumpSerial_MaxUint32_RefusesWrap
- TestLoadRRs_NoSOA_Refused
- TestLoadRRs_MultipleSOAs_Refused
- TestLoadRRs_NonApexSOA_Refused
This commit is contained in:
parent
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2 changed files with 138 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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package rfc2136
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import (
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"math"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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@ -220,6 +221,80 @@ func TestBumpSerial_NonCalVerFormat_ResetsToToday(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// TestBumpSerial_MaxUint32_RefusesWrap covers H5: the defensive
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// branch must not wrap soa.Serial to 0. Wrap-to-0 makes downstream
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// secondaries treat the zone as reset per RFC 1982 and refuse to AXFR
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// the new value, taking the zone dark.
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func TestBumpSerial_MaxUint32_RefusesWrap(t *testing.T) {
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rrs := []dns.RR{
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&dns.SOA{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: "example.com.", Rrtype: dns.TypeSOA},
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Serial: math.MaxUint32},
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}
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now := time.Date(2026, 5, 22, 1, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
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if err := bumpSerial(rrs, now); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("bumpSerial accepted MaxUint32; expected refusal to prevent wrap-to-0")
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}
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if got := rrs[0].(*dns.SOA).Serial; got == 0 {
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t.Errorf("Serial wrapped to 0 (catastrophic): %d", got)
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}
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}
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// TestLoadRRs_NoSOA_Refused covers H4: a zone file that's missing its
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// SOA (because the parser ate it on a malformed prior line, or because
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// it was never there) must fail loadRRs rather than be silently treated
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// as a valid empty-of-SOA zone.
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func TestLoadRRs_NoSOA_Refused(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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path := filepath.Join(dir, "noSoA.example.com.zone")
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content := "$ORIGIN noSoA.example.com.\nfoo.noSoA.example.com. 60 IN A 192.0.2.1\n"
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write fixture: %v", err)
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}
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zf := openZoneFile(path, "noSoA.example.com.")
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if _, _, err := zf.loadRRs(); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("loadRRs accepted SOA-less zone file; expected refusal")
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}
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}
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// TestLoadRRs_MultipleSOAs_Refused covers H3: two SOAs at the apex
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// produce inconsistent zone state visible to AXFR clients. We refuse
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// to operate on such a file rather than bumping only the first SOA.
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func TestLoadRRs_MultipleSOAs_Refused(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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path := filepath.Join(dir, "dupe.example.com.zone")
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content := `$ORIGIN dupe.example.com.
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dupe.example.com. 3600 IN SOA ns.example. admin.example. 1 60 60 60 60
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dupe.example.com. 3600 IN SOA ns.example. admin.example. 2 60 60 60 60
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dupe.example.com. 3600 IN NS ns.example.
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`
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write fixture: %v", err)
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}
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zf := openZoneFile(path, "dupe.example.com.")
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if _, _, err := zf.loadRRs(); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("loadRRs accepted dual-SOA zone; expected refusal")
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}
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}
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// TestLoadRRs_NonApexSOA_Refused covers H3: an SOA owned by a name
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// other than the zone apex is a parse-error red flag and must be
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// refused, not silently bumped.
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func TestLoadRRs_NonApexSOA_Refused(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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path := filepath.Join(dir, "weird.example.com.zone")
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content := `$ORIGIN weird.example.com.
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sub.weird.example.com. 3600 IN SOA ns.example. admin.example. 1 60 60 60 60
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weird.example.com. 3600 IN NS ns.example.
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`
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write fixture: %v", err)
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}
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zf := openZoneFile(path, "weird.example.com.")
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if _, _, err := zf.loadRRs(); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("loadRRs accepted non-apex SOA; expected refusal")
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}
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}
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func TestBumpSerial_NoSOA_ReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
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rrs := []dns.RR{mustRR(t, `foo.example.com. 60 IN A 192.0.2.1`)}
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now := time.Now()
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